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We find that firms in location with higher exposure to climate risk pay significantly higher spreads 
on their bank loans. This result is robust to different measures of climate risk. Exploiting the 
economic link between a firm and its customers, we find that the exposure of a firm’s customers 
to climate risk adversely affects that firm’s cost of borrowing. In the cross-section, we find that 
the effect is mainly driven by long-term loans of poorly rated firms that are highly exposed to 
climate risk. Overall, our evidence suggests a slow increase in lenders’ attention to climate risk 
and that lenders have yet to fully understand and price all dimensions of this risk. 
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We find that firms in location with higher exposure to climate risk pay significantly higher spreads 
on their bank loans. This result is robust to different measures of climate risk. Exploiting the 
economic link between a firm and its customers, we find that the exposure of a firm’s customers 
to climate risk adversely affects that firm’s cost of borrowing. In the cross-section, we find that 
the effect is mainly driven by long-term loans of poorly rated firms that are highly exposed to 
climate risk. Overall, our evidence suggests a slow increase in lenders’ attention to climate risk 
and that lenders have yet to fully understand and price all dimensions of this risk. 
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“Investors are increasingly reckoning with these [climate related] questions and 
recognizing that climate risk is investment risk. Indeed, climate change is almost invariably 
the top issue that clients around the world raise with BlackRock . . . They [investors] are 
seeking to understand both the physical risks associated with climate change as well as the 
ways that climate policy will impact prices, costs, and demand across the entire economy.” 
 - BlackRock Chairman and CEO Larry Fink’s annual letter to CEOs (January 2020) 
1. Introduction 
In this study, we examine whether and to what extent, climate risk affects firms’ cost of capital. 
Specifically, we investigate whether banks view climate change as a relevant risk factor and 
incorporate it into different dimensions of their loan contracts. There is mounting evidence on the 
potential adverse impact of climate risk on the economy and its growth. According to a recent US 
government report2, the US economy is likely to lose as high as 10% of its GDP due to climate 
change by the end of this century. Another study by Economic Intelligence Unit (2015)3 finds that 
the Value at Risk (VaR) of manageable assets due to climate risk is $4.2 trillion. More recently, in 
January 2020, Larry Fink, CEO of BlackRock, one of the world’s largest asset managers, 
announced in his annual letter to CEOs that BlackRock “will now make climate change central to 
its investment considerations.”4  
Moreover, as Painter (2020) points out climate change has been a top shareholder proposal 
issue in recent years. Echoing this concern, BlackRock warns in its 2020 letter to CEOs that it will 
leverage its status as a major shareholder to pressure companies to make adequate progress on 
 
2 Fourth National Climate Assessment (2018), available at https://nca2018.globalchange.gov. This study predicts that 
farming in the Midwest would decline by 75% and the southern part could also lose 25% soybean production. Heat 
stress has been responsible for an average $1.2 billion less dairy production since 2010 and likely to be more extensive 
in the coming years. Wildfire seasons become the longest and most destructive in the history and the severity is 
predicted to be six times higher by 2050. Sea levels go up by more than 7 inches over the last century, in lower latitude 
countries the scenario is even worse. 
3 The Economist Intelligence Unit (2015). The Cost of Inaction: Recognising the Value at Risk from Climate Change. 
[online] London, New York, Hong Kong, Geneva: The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited. Available 
at: https://www.eiuperspectives.economist.com/sites/default/files/The%20cost%20of%20inaction_0.pdf 
4 NPR News link: https://www.npr.org/2020/01/14/796252481/worlds-largest-asset-manager-puts-climate-at-the-
center-of-its-investment-strate.  
Link to Annual Letter to CEOs: https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/larry-fink-ceo-letter 




climate-related issues and will vote against management and board directors who do not. In its 
2017 survey, KPMG reveals that “for the first time in the history of its survey, more than 60% of 
companies across all industry sectors” release a corporate responsibility report5. In 2017, 78% of 
Fortune Global 250 companies released such reports. The continuous and substantial growth of 
this practice since 2011 (44% in 2011, 55% in 2013, and 65% in 2015) reflects the fact that 
investors find climate change to be increasingly relevant. The relevance of climate risk becomes 
even more evident in BlackRock’s recent announcement in 2020 that it will require from the firms 
it invests in to release additional disclosure of climate-related risks and their plans to comply with 
the guidelines of Paris Climate Accord.6 Another evidence on the relevance of climate risk to 
investors is the recent move by Moody’s to purchase a controlling stake in Four Twenty Seven, a 
climate data firm that measures and tracks the impact of climate change on 2,000 companies, 196 
countries, and 761 cities and more than 3,000 counties in the US.7 
Given that climate risk cannot be easily hedged or addressed, how do investors price this 
risk? Bank loans provide a useful setup to study this question. Parallel to the rise of socially 
responsible investing, there has been a substantial growth in environmentally sensitive lending as 
well (Chava, 2014; Cogan, 2008)8 and the evidence suggests that banks are becoming increasingly 




6 The 2015 Paris Climate Accord, a multilateral agreement that involves 175 parties (174 states and the European 
Union), requires a long-term commitment by the signatory parties to reduce their CO2 emission and their carbon 
footprints to assure that the increase in global average temperature is kept bellow 2°C. 
7 https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/24/climate/moodys-ratings-climate-change-data.html 
8 Chava (2014, p. 2223) reports that “a large number of banks, representing approximately 80% of the global lending 
volume, have adopted the Equator Principles (http://www.equator-principles.com), are signatories to the United 
Nations Environment Programme’s Statement by Banks, and have agreed to consider social and environmental issues 
in project finance.” The report by Cogan (2008) also reveals that the global banking sector has a clear agenda to 
include climate change concerns in their lending decisions and that 72.5% of the banks in the survey are involved in 
clean and renewable energy lending. 




one of the most important sources of external finance (Houston and James, 1996). As a percentage 
of GDP, bank loans remain an important source of external finance, with lower and upper middle-
income economies having a ratio of less than 50% by the end of the 2000s, whereas for high 
income economies (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, (OECD)) this ratio 
is slightly below 125% (Allen et al., 2013, Figure 1, p. 764). In addition, it is a well-established 
notion in the banking literature that banks as delegated monitors have access to information that 
may be unavailable to outsiders, and thus they are in a unique position to assess their borrowers’ 
risk and their ability to repay loans. Therefore, if climate change is a relevant risk factor that affects 
firms, banks are more likely to take climate risk into account when lending to firms located in 
areas more vulnerable to climate risk.  
Our empirical findings support the view that climate change is a relevant risk factor to 
lenders and that they charge higher interest rates on loans issued to firms located in states that are 
more exposed to climate risk. Using Loan Pricing Corporation’s (LPC) DealScan database, we 
show that climate risk is positively and significantly associated with loan spreads for a sample of 
40,006 unique bank loans issued to 6,267 unique US firms from 1986 to 2017. For each loan in 
our sample, we first identify the borrowing firm and then use the state of its headquarter to match 
it with our measures of climate risk. Our first measure is Palmer Drought Severity Index (PDSI), 
developed by Palmer (1965). This is a widely used measure in economics, finance and climate 
research (Dai, 2011; Truel et al., 2017; Hong et al., 2019) that extends back to 1895 and is available 
for 48 states (excludes Washington D.C., Alaska and Hawaii). We find that a one standard 
deviation increase in the PDSI Index is associated with 1.6% higher interest on bank loans.  




PDSI Index could capture the short-term variation in weather (climate shocks)9. Therefore, 
what we are finding could be simply attributed to the effect of weather rather than that of a long-
term trend in climate. In fact, according to National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA), “Climate is how the atmosphere "behaves" over relatively long periods of time.” 10 and 
climate studies also point out that there is a time trend in temperature rise that leads to varying 
trends in droughts across different areas over time. To alleviate this concern, we follow Hong et 
al. (2019) to construct our second measure. Using the long time series of PDSI Index, we estimate 
a trend-stationary model, an AR (1) model with a time trend, to determine the long-term climate 
change trend. The coefficient on the time trend is arguably a more reliable measure of exposure to 
climate risk. We find that a one standard deviation increase in the exposure to this measure of 
climate risk is also associated with about 1.6% higher interest rate on bank loans, confirming our 
previous finding. For an average firm in our sample that pays a spread of 1.74% on its loan, a 1.6% 
increase in spread is equivalent to about a 92% rise in its bank loan cost and tantamount to an 
additional $10.5 million interest payment. As a robustness check, we use the data from Spatial 
Hazard Events and Losses Database for the United States (SHELDUS) to construct three more 
measures of climate risk. These measures are based on the duration (in days) and the losses (in 
billion dollars) to properties and crops associated with natural hazards linked to climate change. 
Regression results using these climate risk measures further confirm our earlier findings.  
Using a firm headquarter to determine its exposure to climate risk is a legitimate concern 
with our analysis. Firm headquarter locations are usually close to their operational activities and 
representative of their core business activities (Coval and Moskowitz, 1999; Pirinsky and Wang, 
 
9 Moody’s defines climate shock as extreme weather events like natural disasters, floods, and droughts and 
differentiates between climate change and climate shock: https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-Climate-
change-is-forecast-to-heighten-US-exposure-to--PR_376056 
10 See https://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/noaa-n/climate/climate_weather.html 




2006; Ivkovic and Weisbenner, 2007; Hilary and Hui, 2009; Chaney et al., 2012; Korniotis and 
Kumar, 2013; Tuzel and Zhang, 2017). Corporate decision makers also reside nearby firm 
headquarters and they are the key players of the business (Davis and Henderson, 2008). However, 
a firm’s headquarter location and its actual operation location might be different in some cases 
(Troung et al., 2017), which would undermine the credibility of our findings. We alleviate this 
concern by exploiting the economic link between a firm and its customers. A firms’ customers 
play a vital role in its growth and economic prosperity. It follows that if a firm’s customers are 
more exposed to climate risk, given the economic link between a firm and its customers, the cost 
of bank loan for that firm should be higher, if climate change is viewed as a relevant risk factor by 
lenders. Using COMPUSTAT Capital IQ Segments data, we first identify the location of the 
customers of the borrowing firms in our sample, and then we repeat our analysis using the long-
term climate change trend of the customer locations. Results of this analysis confirm our earlier 
findings. Specifically, a one standard deviation increase in climate risk exposure of a firm’s 
customers is associated with a 0.78% rise in the interest rate of a loan issued to that firm. Compared 
to the average loan spread of our sample, this is equivalent to about 45% increase in the cost of 
bank loans. 
Further, climate risk has a long-term and gradual nature and thus, it is more likely to inflict 
damage in long-term. Therefore, if lenders view climate change as a risk factor, borrowing firms 
located in states more exposed to climate risk should pay a higher spread on their long-term loans 
compared to those in states less exposed to climate risk. On the contrary, it is unlikely that lenders 
price climate risk in short-term loans irrespective of the borrowing firm’s exposure to climate risk. 
Poorly rated firms are also more susceptible to climate risk. The fact that these firms are closer to 
their default threshold (Merton, 1974) along with their financial constraints, lower borrowing 




capacity and limited flexibility expose them more to the adverse impact of climate risk. We explore 
these cross-sectional variations and our results support these predictions.  
We find that the adverse effect of climate risk is mainly driven by long-term loans (greater 
than median maturity) of firms with speculative credit rating that are highly exposed to climate 
risk (greater than median climate risk). We show that for other loan subsamples that exclude any 
of these characteristics, the effect becomes statistically insignificant. For example, with a 
representative specification, we find that a one standard deviation increase in climate risk is 
associated with a 2.23% rise in the spread of long-term loans issued to poorly rated firms that are 
highly exposed to climate risk. Whereas, the impact of climate risk on loan spread is statistically 
insignificant for all other loan subsamples such as short-term loans issued to speculative rated 
firms that are highly exposed to climate risk. 
We further verify our findings by conducting a quasi-natural experiment based on an event 
that could significantly increase lender’s attention to climate risk. Following Painter (2020), we 
compare the loan spreads before and after the release of the Stern Review in 2006 (Stern, 2008). 
This is a 700-page report released for the government of United Kingdom and is the largest and 
most widely known and discussed report related to climate change. Our difference-in-difference 
analysis around the Stern Review confirms the earlier findings. We find a statistically significant 
difference of about 7-bps (t-stat = 1.79) in the loan spread between long-term loans of poorly rated 
firms with high exposure to climate risk and all other loans after the release of the Stern Review. 
We do not find such result for other loan subsamples.  
Furthermore, lenders have other options beyond loan spread to mitigate the risks associated 
with their borrowers (Dennis et al., 2000; Goss and Roberts, 2011). For example, they can issue 
secured loans, shorten maturity, and increase up-front fees. We explore these options, and we find 




weak and suggestive evidence consistent with these predictions when we use the entire sample. 
However, results significantly improve when we restrict the sample to long-term loans of firms 
with speculative credit rating that are highly exposed to climate risk. We find that for this loan 
subsample, as climate risk increases lenders significantly reduce the size of the loan, are more 
likely to issue a secured loan, and increase the number of covenants while the number of 
participants of loan syndicate decreases. Specifically, a one standard deviation increase in climate 
risk is associated with a decrease of 8.64% and 8.14% in the loan size and the number of lenders 
in the loan syndicate, respectively, and with a 14.3% increase in the number of covenants included 
in the loan. It also increases the likelihood of issuing a secured loan by about 3%. This set of results 
is consistent with our earlier findings that the impact of climate risk on bank loans is mainly driven 
by long-term loans of poorly rated firms that are highly exposed to this risk. 
Our paper belongs to a fast-growing literature that investigates the pricing of climate risk 
in financial markets. Chava (2014) finds that investors demand higher cost of capital for firms 
excluded by environmental screens (e.g., climate change concerns, substantial emissions etc.), and 
that lower number of institutional investors and fewer banks participate in their loan syndication. 
Truong et al. (2017) find that climate change risk in the form of drought is not easily diversifiable 
and the market prices this risk into firm-level equity risk premium. Similarly, Bernstein et al. 
(2019) find that sea level rise reduces the value of exposed homes by about 7% compared to 
unexposed properties. While Hong et al. (2019) find that financial markets underreact to climate 
risk, Bansal et al. (2016) document that markets do price climate risk. They find a negative impact 
on asset prices of climate risk. Likewise, Painter (2020) find that the US counties more exposed to 
climate risk pay greater underwriting fees and initial yields to issue long-term municipal bonds 
compared to the counties unlikely to be affected by climate change. Our results contribute to this 




literature and adds to the evidence on the pricing of climate risk. Also, consistent with Painter 
(2020), our results suggest that investor attention to climate risk is an important factor in pricing 
this risk. 
Our paper also adds to the evidence on the financial consequences of climate risk. These 
consequences can be in the form of production risk (Hong et al, 2019), reputation, 
regulatory/litigation risk (Chava, 2014) and physical risk (Painter, 2020). Our results suggest that 
lenders are concerned about the physical risk of climate change and that they require a premium 
for bearing this risk. The debate about climate change and its causes have no impact on this 
premium. Requiring this premium is the consequence of the increased physical risk and uncertainty 
about repaying loans to lenders caused by climate change, regardless of climate risk realization. 
This study also contributes to the literature on the determinants of cost of bank loans. Our 
results reflect banks sensitivity to climate risk and adds to the evidence on environmentally 
sensitive lending provided by Chang et al. (2018), Chava (2014), and Cogan (2008). We show that 
in addition to the usual default risk proxies that affect different aspects of loan contracts (see 
Dennis et al., 2000), the risk associated with climate change also affects the cost and other features 
of loans.  
This study is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the data, measurement of climate 
risk and our empirical design. In Section 3, we report our main empirical findings. Subsample 
analysis is conducted in Section 4. We examine lenders attention by conducting a quasi-natural 
experiment around the release of the Stern Report in Section 5. In Section 6, we investigate the 
impact of climate risk on other features of a loan contract. Section 7 concludes. 




2. Data and Empirical Design 
2.1. Loan Data 
We obtain syndicated loan data from Thomson Reuters Loan Pricing Corporation, DealScan. 
Specifically, we study loans that originated between 1986 and 2017. DealScan includes data on 
loan prices, terms, and detailed information related to the lenders and borrowers. Each loan is 
identified as a distinct observation, and the price and nonprice terms are fixed at the facility level. 
For each facility, we collect the all-in-spread-drawn variable (the total annual spread, paid over 
London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR)) as a measure for the cost of a bank loan. Firms’ 
accounting information is from COMPUSTAT. Firms with negative all-in-spread-drawn and a 
leverage ratio more than one are dropped. We merge COMPUSTAT data with the DealScan data 
using the information available at the end of the most recent year prior to the time of loan 
origination and the COMPUSTAT-DealScan link provided by Chava and Roberts (2008). An 
average firm in our sample has financed about 38% of its assets with debt and pays a loan spread 
of about 174 bps. The average loan facility has a size of about $659 million, matures in about 46 
months, and has about 8 participants in the loan syndicate. About 68% of the loans in our sample 
are secured whereas term loans represent about 27% of the loans in our sample. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
2.2. Measuring Climate Risk 
2.2.1. PDSI data 
We collect historical PDSI data from National Climate Data Center (NCDC) of US National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)11 updated in monthly frequency and extends 
back to 1895. This data is collected by specific measuring geo-stations from 48 different states 
 
11 Available at www.ncdc.noaa.gov/temp-and-precip/drought/historical-palmers [Accessed on December 15, 2018] 




(the dataset is not available for Alaska and we exclude data from Hawaii so our focus would be on 
the US mainland). Following Truong et al. (2017), we aggregate the data to state level by taking 
the average of the monthly PDSIs across all geo-stations for each state. We then aggregate this 
measure to state-year level by taking the average of monthly state PDSIs from June of year (𝑡 −
1) to May of year 𝑡. PDSI is standardized to a range from -10 to +10 where the lower values 
indicate more severe droughts. To make the exposition easier, we use the negative of PDSI 
(NEGPDSI) as the measure of climate risk in our analysis, where higher values are associated with 
greater climate risk. This climate risk measure has a mean value of -0.061 across all states during 
our sample period. Standard deviation of this measure is about 1.67, more than twice the mean, 
suggesting substantial variation in our climate risk measure.  
2.2.2. Trend analysis  
While our first climate risk measure, NEGPDSI, is fairly accurate in measuring drought 
intensity and is widely used in climate studies, it can also reflect short-term variation in weather. 
However, climate change is mainly viewed as a change in long-term trend in climate and climate 
scientists investigate long-term trends of weather patterns for climate change analysis.12 Following 
Hong et al. (2019), we address this issue by exploiting the long time-series data available for PDSI 
that stretches back to 1895 and estimating a trend-stationary model, an AR (1) model with a time 
trend. The coefficient on the time trend is arguably a more reliable measure of exposure to climate 
risk since it captures the long-term trend in climate: 
𝑷𝑫𝑺𝑰𝒔,𝒕 = 𝒂 + 𝒃 ∗ 𝑻𝒊𝒎𝒆𝒔 + 𝒄 ∗ 𝑷𝑫𝑺𝑰𝒔,𝒕 𝟏 + 𝜺𝒔,𝒕                     (𝟏) 
 
12 See https://www.climate.gov/taxonomy/term/3434 




Here, our parameter of interest is the coefficient of Time, b, which captures the differential 
time trends in droughts of each state as well as the longer-run climate change vulnerability of the 
states through droughts. We estimate regression (1) month by month for each state from 1986 to 
2017. We construct our second measure of climate risk that captures the long-term trend of climate, 
by taking the average of the monthly time coefficients for each state. To remain consistent with 
our first measure, we multiply our trend measure by -1. In this way, the greater the trend variable, 
TREND, the lager the exposure to climate risk. This climate risk measure has a mean of -0.022 
and a standard deviation of 0.061 which is almost three times larger than the mean, implying 
substantial variation in this measure. Moreover, the correlation between TREND and NEGPDSI 
is about 34% and statistically significant.  
Table A.2 in the appendix reports the results of the AR (1) model and provides states 
ranking in terms of climate change trends. Reported time trend coefficients and the resulting state 
ranking are based on the average of all the time betas across all months for every state. California 
has the highest climate change long-term trend with the average time beta value of 0.071 while 
Vermont has the lowest climate change long-term trend with average time beta value of -0.227. 
Some of the states with higher long-term climate change trend are Florida, New Jersey, Montana, 
Connecticut, Delaware, Wyoming, Utah, Arizona, Colorado and Nevada. Accordingly, some of 
the states with lower climate change trend are New Hampshire, Alabama, Mississippi, Tennessee, 
Michigan, Louisiana, New York, Kentucky, Indiana and Maine. The other states fall in between, 
having moderate long-term climate change trends. Figure A.1 (in the Appendix) is a graphical 
representation of the evolution in the long-term trend change in climate for 48 mainland states of 
the US. There are clearly substantial differences in trend patterns among states. While some of the 
states show gradual increasing trends towards drought, few others show the gradual inclination 




towards the moistures. To better highlight this issue in figure1 below, we depict the trend pattern 
for California and Vermont. 
   [Insert Figure 1 about here] 
Finally, we merge these climate risk measures with our Dealscan loan data by first determining 
the headquarter of the borrowing firms in our sample from COMPUSTAT and then merge the 
datasets based on state and year. The final dataset contains 40,006 unique bank loans issued to 
6,267 unique US firms from 1986 to 2017. 
2.3. Empirical Design 
We formally investigate the impact of climate risk on loan spreads by estimating the following 
regression model: 
  𝑳𝒐𝒈 (𝑺𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒅)𝒊,𝒋,𝒌,𝒕 = 𝜶 + 𝜷 ∗ 𝑪𝒍𝒊𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝑹𝒊𝒔𝒌𝒌,𝒕 + 𝜸 ∗ 𝑭𝒊𝒓𝒎 𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒐𝒍𝒔𝒋,𝒕 + 𝜹 ∗ 𝑳𝒐𝒂𝒏 𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒐𝒍𝒔𝒊,𝒕 +
𝑰𝒏𝒅𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒚𝒋 + 𝒀𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒕 + 𝜺𝒋,𝒌,𝒕         (2) 
Here, the unit of observation is facility (loan), i≡loan ID, j≡firm ID, k≡firm headquarter state ID, 
and t≡time. The dependent variable, Log (Spread), is log-transformed version of loan spread 
which is the all-in-drawn spread over LIBOR (i.e., the amount paid by borrowers annually over 
LIBOR in basis points). The coefficient of interest is β. A positive and statistically significant β 
would suggest an adverse impact of climate risk on cost of bank loans. Following the literature 
(e.g., Bradley and Roberts, 2015; Qian and Strahan, 2007; Graham et al., 2008; Chava, 2014), we 
also include a wide range of control variables that could potentially affect the cost of bank loans. 
These control variables include borrower and loan characteristics.  
The first set of these variables controls for borrower characteristics and includes asset size, 
profitability (ROA), Market-to-Book and leverage. It is important to control for size because on 




the one hand, larger firms have less trouble accessing external financing and have fewer 
information asymmetry problems. Therefore, they are likely to have a lower cost of bank loans. 
On the other hand, due to their sheer size, larger firms can borrow more and as a result may have 
higher borrowing costs.  We also control for firms’ profitability because profitable firms have a 
lower chance of default and are expected to pay a lower spread on their loans. Leverage is another 
firm-level control variable. It is one of the main inputs in Merton’s (1974) distance to default 
formula; thus, firms with a higher leverage ratio have a higher default risk. All else equal, these 
firms are expected to have a higher cost of bank loans, making it imperative to control for leverage. 
A second set of control variables is related to loan characteristics. These variables include 
all loan types and purposes. Loan purposes are generally categorized into capital expenditures, 
backup line, general purposes, recapitalization, refinancing, acquisitions, and other purposes. We 
also control whether a loan is a term loan. Detailed information about all variables, their sources, 
and measurements are provided in Table A.1 in the Appendix. 
All regression specifications include year fixed effects and industry fixed effects. Given 
that some banks may be more sensitive to climate risk, we also include bank (lending) fixed effect. 
We use DealScan’s lenders dataset to identify the main lender. We also use on-way cluster robust 
standard errors at the firm level as well as two-way cluster at the firm and state level in separate 
specifications. 
3. Empirical Findings 
3.1. Univariate Analysis 
Our first evidence on the adverse impact of climate risk on the cost of bank loan is reported in 
Table 2. In panel A, the correlation between loan spread and our two measures of climate risk is 
positive and statistically significant. In panel B, we sort loan facilities into quartiles based on their 
exposure to climate risk and report the mean loan spread for the bottom (minimum exposure to 




climate risk) and the top quartile. Irrespective of the climate risk measure, firms in the top climate 
risk quartile pay significantly higher spread on their loans, between 21- to 15-basis points, 
compared to those in bottom quartile.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
It is noteworthy to highlight that belonging to top or bottom quartile of climate risk is 
exclusively determined by the state where a firm headquarter is located. It is unlikely and hard to 
argue that climate risk was a significant factor when firms chose a state for their headquarter. 
Therefore, if we accept the premise that climate risk is relatively exogenous, the significant 
difference in the loan spreads resulting mainly from the difference in the geographical location of 
firms’ headquarter is a reliable indication that climate risk does have an adverse impact on the cost 
of bank loan. 
3.2. Loan Spread and PDSI 
For the first set of regressions, we use the drought index, NEGPDSI, as our first measure of 
climate risk. Results are reported in Table 3. In all specifications, the coefficients on climate risk 
are positive and statistically significant. The magnitude of these coefficients does not vary with 
model specifications, suggesting a robust adverse impact of climate risk on loan spreads. The effect 
is also economically significant. Taking the average of the climate risk coefficients across all 
model specification (0.0095), we find that a one standard deviation increase in NEGPDSI (1.675) 
is associated with about 1.6% increase in the loan spread. For an average firm in our sample that 
pays an interest rate of 1.74% on its loan, a 1.6% increase in its loan spread is equivalent to a 92% 
surge in its cost of bank loan and tantamount to an additional $10.5 million in interest payment. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 




The coefficients of the control variables in all specifications have the expected sign and 
consistent with the prior literature (Bradley and Roberts 2015; Chava et al. 2009; Chava, 2014). 
Larger firms have lower loan spreads, whereas firms with higher leverage have higher loan 
spreads. More profitable firms pay lower interest on their loan (though the effect is statistically 
insignificant). Firms with high market to book ratio are relatively farther from financial distress 
and therefore pay a lower loan spread.  
3.3. Loan Spread and Trend 
Our findings in the previous section could be attributed to the short-term variation in weather 
rather than climate change. The reason is that climate change is about the change in the long-term 
trend in the climate. To address this issue, in this section we use our second measure of climate 
risk, TREND, defined in Section 2.2.2, in regression model (1). Results are reported in Table 4. 
We find a robust positive association between TREND and loan spread. Focusing on the last 
column that has the richest set of fixed effects with two-way clustering of standard errors at the 
firm and state levels, the coefficient on TREND (β=0.214; t-stat=1.73) indicates that a one standard 
deviation increase in TREND (0.061) is associated with about 1.3% increase in loan spread. 
Compared to the average loan spread (1.74%), a 1.3% increase is equivalent to about 75% rise in 
the cost of bank loan. This result is consistent with our earlier finding in Table 3. In fact, if we take 
the average of all the TREND coefficients across all specifications, the economic effect is identical 
to that of the PDSI index reported in Table 3: a one standard deviation increase in the climate risk 
(TREND) is associated with 1.6% rise in the loan spread.  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
3.4. Loan Spread and SCHELDUS: A Robustness check 
We further confirm these results by using three more measures of climate risk. We construct 
these measures from Spatial Hazard Events and Losses Database for the United States 




(SHELDUS) 13 maintained by Arizona State University. We use the latest released version (version 
17: November 8, 2018). The database contains information about the duration (in days) of different 
types of natural hazards and losses associated with them (e.g., injuries, fatalities, property and 
corporate losses in dollar amount etc.). We construct these measures using the (natural log of) 
duration, the property losses and corporate losses (both in billion dollars adjusted for 2017) 
associated with natural hazards that are linked to climate change, namely hurricanes, 
thunderstorms, floods, tornados, and heavy rainfalls.  
The correlation between these three measures, NEGPDSI and TREND ranges from -0.059 to 
12.8, indicating that these measures possibly capture a different dimension of climate risk. 
Correlations between these measures and TREND and NEGPDSI are reported in Table A.3. in the 
Appendix. We estimate regression model (2) using each of these climate risk measures separately. 
Results are reported in Table 5 and they corroborate our earlier findings. Coefficient on climate 
risk is positive and statistically significant in all specifications for all three measures.  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
3.5. Loan Spread and Customer Climate Risk Exposure  
A legitimate concern with our analysis is using a firm headquarter location to determine its 
exposure to climate risk. Pirinsky and Wang (2006) find that stock returns of firms in the same 
geographical area have strong comovement. Chaney et al. (2012) argue that a firm’s major 
production plants are usually clustered in the same state where the headquarter is located. Using 
COMPUSTAT data, Truong et al. (2017) find that firms have greater real estate ownership in 
headquarter state, suggesting a firm headquarter location is a reasonable proxy for the location of 
their operation. However, this approach has limitations. It is easy to argue that a firm headquarter, 
 
13 Accessed from https://cemhs.asu.edu/sheldus 




and its main operation locations may not necessarily be the same. This issue could undermine the 
credibility of our findings. In this section we exploit the economic link between a firm and its 
customers to alleviate this issue and provide further evidence on the adverse impact of climate risk 
on the cost of bank loan. We use COMPUSTAT Capital IQ Segments data to identify the location 
of the customers of the borrowing firms in our sample. COMPUSTAT Customer Segments data 
provides the geographical area of a firm’s customer (basically by country or region). 
A borrowing firm in our sample may have foreign customers reported on Customer 
Segments data. Therefore, we collect global PDSI data from NCAR14. Calibrated global PDSI data 
are available in monthly frequencies from January 1850 to December 2014 and for specific 
geographic longitude and latitude coordinate points. We convert these points to their physical 
locations (countries) by reverse geo-coding15. Given the superiority of TREND, the long-term 
trend, in measuring climate risk, we use this measure for the current analysis and the rest of the 
paper. We determine the long-term time trend following the procedure described in Section 2.2.2. 
Once again, for the ease of exposition and to remain consistent with previous analyses, we use the 
negative of the time trend coefficient (the larger value would indicate greater climate risk 
exposure). In the next step, we first merge this newly constructed country-level climate risk 
measure with customer segments data using customer country and year and then merge that with 
our working dataset. The final dataset contains climate risk exposure of the borrowing firms in our 
sample as well as that of their customers. Employing this dataset, we use the climate risk of the 
borrowing firms’ customers and estimate regression model (2). The economic link between a firm 
and its customer suggests that if the customers of a firm are more exposed to climate risk, lenders 
 
14 Accessed from https://www.esrl.noaa.gov/psd/data/gridded/data.pdsi.html [Accessed on June 25, 2019] 
15 We use https://www.latlong.net/Show-Latitude-Longitude.html 




should charge a higher interest on the loan issued to that firm, predicting a positive coefficient on 
customers’ climate risk variable in model (2). Results reported in Table 6 support this prediction.  
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
We document a robust positive association between the climate risk exposure of the 
customers and the loan spread of the borrowing firms that are both statistically and economically 
significant. This result is consistent with our earlier findings. The magnitude of the coefficients is 
insensitive to model specifications, establishing more confidence in identifying the adverse 
economic impact of climate risk on cost of bank loan. Specifically, our results indicate that a one 
standard deviation increase (0.05) in the climate risk exposure of our borrowing firms’ customers 
is associated with about 0.78% increase in the cost of loan. For an average firm in our sample that 
pays a loan spread of 174-basis point, a 0.78% rise is equivalent to about 45% increase in the cost 
of bank loans and additional $5.1 million interest payment. Given the economic link between our 
sample firms and their customers and that climate risk is arguably exogeneous, these results 
establish more confidence in a casual interpretation of our findings. 
4. Subsample Analysis 
4.1.  Loan Portfolio Sorts  
Climate risk has a long-term nature in a sense that it is more likely to cause more destruction 
and loss in a few decades in the future compared to a few years. Therefore, firms seeking loans 
with longer maturities are more likely to be adversely affected; and borrowing firms located in 
states more exposed to climate risk should pay a higher spread on their long-term loans compared 
to those in states less exposed to climate risk. On the contrary, lenders are unlikely to price climate 
risk in short-term loans.  
In our first test, we independently sort loan facilities into quartile groups based on their 
maturity and their exposure to climate risk. Results in Table 7 show that for each maturity quartile, 




average loan spread increases with exposure to climate risk and the difference between the top and 
bottom climate risk quartile for each maturity group is statistically significant. For example, 
focusing on the top (bottom) maturity quartile, the group with longest (shortest) maturity, the 
difference in the average loan spread between the top climate risk quartile and the bottom climate 
risk quartile is about 11-bps (17.5-bps) and statistically significant. Likewise, for each climate risk 
quartile, loan spread increase with maturity. In the top (bottom) climate risk quartile, the group 
with the highest (lowest) exposure to climate risk, the difference in the average loan spread 
between the top maturity quartile and the bottom maturity quartile is about 75-bps (81-bps) and 
statistically significant. The mean loan spread of a loan portfolio that has the highest exposure to 
climate risk and longest maturity is greater than that of a loan portfolio with lowest exposure to 
climate risk and shortest maturity by more than 92-bps and statistically significant.   
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
4.2. Loan Subsample Regressions 
In this section, we investigate the cross-sectional heterogeneity in the effect of climate risk 
on the cost of bank loan more formally by running regressions for a series of loan subsamples. Our 
evidence from loan portfolios in the previous section provides compelling evidence that the 
adverse effect of climate risk is stronger for loans with longer maturities. In addition to loans with 
longer maturity, the adverse impact of climate risk is also expected to be more pronounced for 
poorly rated firms. Moody’s has viewed climate change as a credit risk factor for states and 
counties as early as November 2016.16 This view is stressed in another announcement a year later 
in November 2017 17 and further expanded to include corporation by their acquisition of a 








exposure of firms in addition to countries, cities and counties. The global head of assessments at 
Moody’s Investors Service says that “We are taking these risks very seriously”. As highlighted in 
Moody’s reports and Painter (2020), having higher debt capacity is particularly crucial. Firms with 
poor credit ratings are not only closer to their default threshold but also suffer from financial 
constraints and lower borrowing capability which collectively results in limited financial 
flexibility. This issue impedes their ability to raise funds to cover the losses caused by climate risk 
or finance projects to prevent and mitigate its impact. Therefore, if lenders recognize this issue, 
the adverse impact of climate risk should also be more pronounced for poorly rated firms.  
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
We explore these cross-sectional variations and report the results in Table 8. In Panel A, 
results confirm that the adverse effect of climate risk is mainly driven by poorly rated firms. We 
split the sample into investment and non-investment subsamples. Firms with a BBB rating or better 
are categorized into the investment group, and firms with credit rating below that are in the non-
investment group. In all specifications, the coefficients on TREND are positive and statistically 
significant for the non-investment subsample whereas they are insignificant for the investment 
subsample.  
In Panel B, we split the sample into loans with high and low maturity. If a loan maturity is 
larger (smaller) than the sample median, it belongs to the long (short) maturity category. Results 
are inconclusive. We find that the adverse effect of climate risk is relatively more pronounced for 
long maturity subsample when using specifications with lower number of fixed effects (columns 
1 to 3). However, the difference in the size of the TREND coefficient between the two groups 
decreases substantially as model specifications become stricter (columns 4 to 6). In the last two 




specifications (columns 4 and 5) that have the richest set of fixed effects and clustering of standard 
errors the TREND coefficient is statistically insignificant for both categories.  
The above result is seemingly inconsistent with our conjecture about the impact of maturity 
and appears to contradict our earlier findings from sorting loan portfolios reported in Table 7. 
However, loan portfolios are independently sorted based on their maturity and their exposure to 
climate risk. Therefore, the insignificant result in Panel B of Table 8 combined with the results of 
loan portfolio sorts in Table 7, indicate that the adverse effect of climate risk may be concentrated 
in a loan subsample characterized by long maturity and high exposure to climate risk. In fact, 
results reported in Panel C of Table 8 add to the credibility of this conjecture. In Panel C, we split 
the sample into high and low climate risk exposure depending on whether a firm’s climate risk 
exposure is above the sample median. The direction of the result is generally consistent with 
expectation. TREND coefficients are positive in high climate risk category while they are negative 
in low climate risk subsample. However, the statistical significance is lost in specifications with 
more fixed effects and clustering of standard errors (columns 5 and 6). This result together with 
those in Panels A and B and Table 7, suggest that the adverse effect of climate risk is likely to be 
driven by a subsample of loans that are long-term, issued to poorly rated firms located in areas 
with high exposure to climate risk. We explore this conjecture in the next section. 
4.3. Loan Subsample Driving the effect 
In this section we examine the conjecture that the adverse effect of climate risk is mainly 
concentrated in long-term loans of poorly rated firms that are highly exposed to climate risk. We 
report the results of our regressions in Table 9. In Panel A, we estimate regression model (2) using 
a sample comprised of long-term loans issued to poorly rated firms that are highly exposed to 
climate risk. This subsample is an intersection of the three subsamples analyzed in Table 8. The 
coefficient on TREND is positive and statistically significant in all model specifications. The size 




of the coefficients is also relatively stable. This result implies a robust adverse impact of climate 
risk on the cost bank loans for poorly rated firms with high exposure to climate risk seeking a long-
term loan and is consistent with our conjecture.  
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
However, there are a series of concerns with this analysis and the subsequent conclusion that 
the adverse effect of climate risk is driven by this subsample. For one, loan spreads of poorly rated 
firms, very much like their bond yield spreads, are very sensitive. In a regression setting, where 
loan or yield spreads are the dependent variable, generally the coefficients estimated for a non-
investment sample suggest an amplification of the effect being studied. This amplification of the 
effect, sometimes, is not connected to any economic justification and is just simply an artifact of 
the sample that is comprised of poorly rated entities. Moreover, long-term loans also face a similar 
issue. Spreads on long-term loans (and bonds) are very sensitive and as a dependent variable in a 
regression, they could produce coefficient estimates that would imply a more pronounced effect. 
Therefore, our documented robust adverse effect of climate risk on a subsample of long-term loans 
issued to poorly rated firms that are highly exposed to climate risk may simply be the artifact of 
the sample. Hence, it is imperative to address this issue and provide more evidence consistent with 
our conclusion. 
We address these issues in the Panels B through E of Table 9. We find that if any of the three 
characteristics of tis subsample (long maturity, poorly rated, and highly exposed to climate risk) 
is changed or excluded, the effect of climate risk becomes statistically insignificant. For example, 
our results in Panel B indicate that the effect of climate risk becomes statistically insignificant if 
the long maturity component is changed to short maturity. In other words, insignificant climate 
risk effect for a subsample of short-term loans issued to poorly rated firms with high climate risk 




exposure. Similarly, in Panel C, we replace the loans highly exposed to climate risk with those that 
have low exposure. We find that the effect of climate risk is insignificant for the resulting 
subsample, long-term loans of speculative rated firms with low exposure to climate risk. In Panel 
D, we focus on a subsample of long-term loans issued to firms with high credit quality but highly 
exposed to climate risk; and we find the effect is insignificant. Finally, Panel E reports the 
regression results for a subsample of short-term loans of highly rated firms with low climate risk 
exposure. As expected, the effect of climate risk is insignificant. 
Results in Panels B and C alleviate the concern related to the sensitivity of loan spreads of 
poorly rated firms. Results in Panels C and D address the concern related to the sensitivity of the 
spreads on long-term loans. Collectively, the results in Panels B through E alleviate the concerns 
that the adverse effect of climate risk documented in Panel A is just an artifact of the subsample 
and that it is simply a manifestation of the sensitivity of the spreads on long-term loans of poorly 
rated firms. Overall, the results of this table suggest that the adverse effect of climate risk is mainly 
driven by a subsample of long-term loans issued to poorly rated firms that have high exposure to 
climate risk. 
4.4. Food Industry Subsample 
As discussed by Hong et al (2019), drought conditions have considerable negative impact on 
food industry. The reason is that the food industry is heavily dependent on water and hence 
significantly sensitive to drought. Therefore, firms in the food industry are likely to experience 
lower profits when facing adverse drought conditions. Given that our main measure of climate risk 
is rooted in drought condition, it follows that the effect of climate risk should be stronger among 
the borrowing firms in the food industry. Moreover, the results documented in the previous section 
imply that this stronger effect should be mainly driven by the poorly rated firms in the food 




industry that are highly exposed to climate risk and seek a long-term loan. However, the results of 
our analysis are inconsistent with these predictions. We find no marginal difference between firms 
in the “Food” industry and others irrespective how Food industry is defined and whether we use 
the long-term, poorly rated, and highly exposed subsample.18 This insignificant result could be the 
artifact of our sample since there are only about 1,000 observations that belong to the Food 
industry. Alternatively, this result can perhaps be explained by the fact that lenders do not simply 
see much difference between firms in the Food industry and others. This interpretation would then 
be consistent with the financial market underreaction to climate risk documented by Hong et al 
(2019), and would reflect the fact that financial market has yet to fully understand and price all 
dimensions of climate risk. 
5. Stern Review 
In this section, we examine the role of investor attention in pricing of the climate risk in the 
loan spreads. Markets might not pay enough attention to risks that they have had little experience 
to deal with and digest, which could lead to market underreaction to that risk. Market 
inattentiveness to different types of value relevant information or risks is well documented in the 
literature (Hong et al., 2007, DellaVigna and Pollet, 2007; Cohen and Frazzini, 2008; Hong et al., 
2019). To identify the effect of market attention on the pricing of climate risk in loan spreads, we 
follow Painter (2020) and conduct a quasi-natural experiment surrounding the release of the Stern 
Review. This is a 700-page report released for the government of United Kingdom and is the 
largest and most widely known and discussed report related to climate change and is commonly 
credited with substantially raising awareness to climate change.  
 
18 We do not report the results to save space. We use Fama-French 48 industry classification to define the Food 
industry. Our analysis separately considers FF industry classification codes 1 (Agriculture), 2 (Food Products), 1 and 
2 together, and 1, 2, 3 (Soda), and 4 (Beer & Liquor) together. 




The release of this report is unlikely to have affected the risk profile of the borrowing firms 
other than through increased awareness of climate risk. Thus, a significant rise in the cost of bank 
loan after the Stern Review suggests that lenders attention significantly affects the pricing of 
climate risk in the loan spreads. To isolate the effect of market attention, we restrict the sample to 
loans issued in two timeframes around the release of the Stern Report: a five-year and a ten-year 
window. We report the results in Table 10. In the first two columns, the interaction term between 
TREND and Stern is statistically insignificant, suggesting that lenders attention does not play any 
role in pricing of the climate risk in loan spreads.  
[Insert Table 10 and Figure 2 about here] 
On the one hand, this result is inconsistent with expectation and the findings in Painter (2020). 
On the other hand, we provide evidence in Section 4.3 that climate risk is mainly concentrated in 
a subsample of loans that are long-term, issued to poorly rated firms that are highly exposed to 
climate risk. Therefore, it would be imperative to examine if the cross-sectional variation in the 
effect of climate risk has any implications for this analysis. To investigate this issue, we split the 
sample into investment and non-investment categories and conduct our analysis for these two 
groups. Focusing on the investment category and the 10-year window, we find a statistically 
significant difference of about 7-bps (t-stat = 1.79) in the loan spread between long-term loans of 
poorly rated firms with high exposure to climate risk and all other loans in the non-investment 
category after the release of the Stern Review. This result is consistent with our earlier findings 
and highlight the significant cross-sectional heterogeneity in the effect of climate risk on the cost 
of bank loans. Figure 2 depicts the parallel trend between the examined subsample and all other 
loans. This figure shows that in 2006 subsequent to the release of the Stern Report the cost of bank 




loans substantially increases for poorly rated firms that are highly exposed to climate risk and seek 
long-term loans (group one in the figure) compared to all other loans  (group zero in the figure).  
However, for the narrower window of five years, the difference is statistically insignificant, 
suggesting a slow and gradual attention to climate risk by lenders. Results for the investment 
category are insignificant, irrespective of the time window, further signifying that the impact of 
climate risk is mainly driven by poorly rated firms. Overall, these results provide suggestive 
evidence on the slow and gradual attention of lenders to climate risk and they are consistent with 
the documented underreaction of financial market to climate risk by Hong et al. (2019). 
6. Other Loan Contractual Features 
Our results up to this point provide evidence that lenders view climate change as a risk factor 
and therefore charge a higher spread on loans issued to firms located in areas more exposed to this 
risk. However, as pointed out in prior research (Dennis et al., 2000; Goss and Roberts, 2011; 
among others) in addition to directly increasing the cost of loans, lenders have the option to change 
other contractual features of their loans to mitigate the risk associated with their borrowers. 
Specifically, they can issue more secured loans, shorten the maturity, reduce the size of the loan, 
increase up-front fees, and include more restrictive covenant in the loan contract. In this section, 
we focus on these contractual features of loans and test these predictions. We report the results in 
Table 11. 
[Insert Table 11 about here] 
In each panel of Table 11, we separately investigate the effect of climate risk on a contractual 
feature of a loan by estimating an augmented version of regression model (2) that uses that loan 
feature as the dependent variable. While the effect of climate risk on all these loan contractual 
features have the expected direction, with one exception, they are statistically insignificant. We 
find that lenders issue smaller loans and shorten loan maturity while they increase upfront fees, 




include more covenants in their loans, and are more likely to issue secured loans. However, only 
the increase in upfront fee is statistically significant.  
Nonetheless, our results in Section 4.4.3 indicate that climate risk mainly driven by a 
subsample of loans that are long-term, issued to poorly rated firms that are in areas with high 
exposure to climate risk. It would be instructive to check whether this cross-section variation has 
also implications for our analysis of other contractual features of loans. Therefore, we run our 
analysis on this loan subsample. Results substantially improve and they are reported in Table 12. 
[Insert Table 12 about here] 
Results for this subsample indicate that, an increase in the climate risk exposure of a borrower 
is associated with a significant reduction in the size of the loan and an increase in the number of 
covenants included in the loan as well as the likelihood of issuing a secured loan by a lender. A 
one standard deviation increase in climate risk is associated with a decrease of 8.64% in the loan 
size, with about 14.3% increase in the number covenants, and with a 3% rise in the likelihood of 
issuing a secured loan. Overall, while these results provide suggestive evidence that climate risk 
affects other loan features, they support our earlier findings that the impact of climate risk is 
significantly stronger for long-term loans of poorly rated firms with high exposure to climate risk. 
Moreover, results in Panel C of Table 11 and 12 suggest that the number of participants in a 
loan syndicate decreases as a borrowing firm’s exposure to climate risk increases. While the 
direction of the effect is consistent with expectation, the effect of climate risk on the size of loan 
syndicate is statistically insignificant for stricter model specifications in Table 11 that uses the 
entire sample. However, in Table 12 that uses long-term loans of poorly rated firms with high 
climate risk exposure, this effect is significant for all specifications. A one standard deviation 
increase in climate risk is associated with a decrease of 8.14% in the number of lenders in the loan 




syndicate. This result signifies the fact that lenders do view climate change as a risk factor and is 
consistent with the findings in Chava (2014). Additionally, lower number of participants in a loan 
syndicate in and of itself could increase the cost of borrowing. As demonstrated by prior research 
(Merton, 1987; Heinkel et al., 2001), if a sufficiently large number of lenders avoid a borrowing 
firm, this firm would have fewer participants in its loan syndicate and would have to pay a higher 
spread on its loan and our findings confirm this prediction. 
7. Conclusion 
We provide empirical evidence supporting the idea that climate change is viewed as a risk 
factors by lenders and is priced in their loans. Our results are robust to different measures of climate 
risk and different model specifications. To alleviate the concern associated with the setup of our 
empirical design that determines a firm exposure to climate risk based on the state of its 
headquarter, we exploit the economic link between a firm and its customers. We present evidence 
that the exposure of a firm’s customers to climate risk adversely affects that firm’s cost of 
borrowing. Our subsample analyses show that the effect of climate risk is predominantly driven 
by a subsample of loans that are long-term, issued to poorly rated firms that have relatively high 
exposure to climate risk. Our evidence implies that the adverse effect of climate risk is insignificant 
for any other loan subsample that excludes any of these characteristics.  
The analysis around the release of the Stern Report shows a significant increase in the loan 
spreads of the aforementioned loan subsample compared to others. However, this effect exists only 
for a 10-year window and vanishes for a shorter window of 5-year around the release of the report, 
suggesting a slow and gradual attention of lenders to the risk associated with climate change. 
Moreover, we find suggestive evidence that climate risk can affect other contractual features of 
loans. However, consistent with the our earlier findings, the documented effects ⸻ smaller loan 
size, decrease in the syndicate size, increase in the number of included covenants, and the rise in 




the probability of issuing a secured loan ⸻ are mainly driven by the same subsample; long-term 
loans issued to speculative rated firms that are highly exposed to climate risk. 
As pointed out by Painter (2020) the debate about the exitance of climate change has no bearing 
on our study. However, while we do find an adverse impact of climate risk on loan spreads, our 
evidence indicates a slow and gradual increase in lenders’ attention to this risk and that financial 
market has yet to fully understand and price all dimensions of climate risk. The results of this study 
suggest that further discussion and awareness about the consequences of climate change and the 
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Table 1: Summary statistics 
This table reports summary statistics of different variables from our main dataset constructed based on a cross-section 
of 40,006 different loan facilities (data source: LPC DealScan) issued to 6,267 unique firms headquartered in 48 U.S. 
mainland-states during the years 1986 to 2017. Table A.1 (appears in Appendices) provides detailed descriptions and 
sources of all variables. 
VARIABLE N MEAN SD P10 P25 P50 P75 P90 
SPREAD (bps) 40,006 174.430 121.959 40 87.5 150 250 325 
MATURITY (Months) 38,754 46.544 22.931 12 33 51 60 72 
DEAL ($M) 40,006 659 1420 30 85 250 700 1520 
NLENDER 39,985 8.292 8.580 1 2 6 11 19 
TOTALCOV 40,006 3.282 3.474 0 0 3 5 9 
LN_UPFRONT 7,485 3.454 1.057 2.140 2.708 3.401 4.230 4.605 
SECURE LOAN (Dummy) 26,690 0.680 0.466 0 0 1 1 1 
NEGPDSI 40,006 -0.061 1.675 -2.219 -1.176 -0.143 0.950 2.101 
TREND 40,006 -0.022 0.061 -0.099 -0.063 -0.031 0.030 0.063 
DURATION (Days) 40,006 48.017 347.882 2 4 10 30 31 
LN_AT 40,006 7.173 1.969 4.655 5.802 7.127 8.461 9.721 
LEV Ratio 40,006 0.382 0.237 0.072 0.204 0.360 0.536 0.721 
MTB 39,924 1.658 1.116 0.972 1.108 1.362 1.833 2.611 
ROA 39,981 0.033 0.357 -0.044 0.008 0.039 0.076 0.123 
























Table 2: Univariate analysis 
In Panel A of this table, we present pairwise correlations between our key dependent variable, SPREAD, and two of 
our key measures of climate risk (key independent variable), NEGPDSI and TREND. Panel B presents mean t-test 
results of SPREAD from two extreme groups (Q1-first quartile and Q4-fourth quartile) of NEGPDSI and TREND. 
***, **, and * represent significance at 1% level, 5% level, and 10% level respectively. 
Panel A: Pairwise correlation 
VARIABLES (NEGPDSI) (TREND) (SPREAD) 
NEGPDSI 1.000   
TREND 0.344*** 1.000  
SPREAD 0.083*** 0.048*** 1.000 
Panel B: Loan Portfolios 
Basis Q1 Q4 Difference t-stats 
NEGPDSI 166.487 187.508 21.021*** 12.056 

























Table 3: Loan Spread and PDSI  
This table presents Log_Spread (labeled as ln_allindrawn here), as a function of Negative PDSI score (NEGPDSI) 
and controls. Columns (1), (2), (3) include mandatory Year fixed effect and Industry (two-digits SIC) fixed effect. In 
column (1) we use robust standard errors, in column (2) we cluster standard errors by firm, in column (3) we use two-
way clustering of standard errors by firm and state, and in columns (4) to (6) we repeat the models (1) to (3) with 
added Bank (Lending) fixed effects. Values of t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent significance at 
1% level, 5% level, and 10% level respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES ln_allindrawn ln_allindrawn ln_allindrawn ln_allindrawn ln_allindrawn ln_allindrawn 
NEGPDSI 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 
 (5.64) (3.86) (3.41) (4.99) (3.52) (2.74) 
Log (Asset) -0.183*** -0.183*** -0.183*** -0.174*** -0.174*** -0.174*** 
 (-77.13) (-25.29) (-26.38) (-62.23) (-20.76) (-18.49) 
LEV Ratio 0.502*** 0.502*** 0.502*** 0.464*** 0.464*** 0.464*** 
 (33.22) (17.46) (19.88) (30.58) (16.64) (20.04) 
MTB -0.085*** -0.085*** -0.085*** -0.088*** -0.088*** -0.088*** 
 (-6.53) (-5.40) (-3.00) (-6.54) (-5.65) (-3.24) 
ROA -0.065 -0.065 -0.065 -0.046 -0.046 -0.046 
 (-0.81) (-0.81) (-0.93) (-0.71) (-0.71) (-0.79) 
TERMLOAN -0.041** -0.041* -0.041** -0.039** -0.039* -0.039** 
 (-2.17) (-1.83) (-2.28) (-1.96) (-1.73) (-2.39) 
REVOLVER -0.385*** -0.385*** -0.385*** -0.341*** -0.341*** -0.341*** 
 (-19.46) (-16.01) (-18.05) (-16.68) (-14.27) (-17.04) 
MERGER 0.196*** 0.196*** 0.196*** 0.187*** 0.187*** 0.187*** 
 (14.72) (10.27) (10.01) (14.13) (10.17) (10.27) 
LBO 0.996*** 0.996*** 0.996*** 0.848*** 0.848*** 0.848*** 
 (27.12) (16.65) (20.33) (23.14) (14.73) (17.05) 
CORPPURP 0.073*** 0.073*** 0.073*** 0.087*** 0.087*** 0.087*** 
 (6.19) (4.50) (4.35) (7.53) (5.47) (5.69) 
DEBTPAY 0.205*** 0.205*** 0.205*** 0.197*** 0.197*** 0.197*** 
 (14.88) (11.09) (11.27) (14.40) (10.81) (10.68) 
OTHERTYPE -0.634*** -0.634*** -0.634*** -0.586*** -0.586*** -0.586*** 
 (-27.40) (-21.22) (-19.42) (-24.71) (-19.54) (-19.41) 
WORKCAP 0.134*** 0.134*** 0.134*** 0.141*** 0.141*** 0.141*** 
 (10.42) (7.26) (6.38) (11.17) (7.93) (7.03) 
Constant 6.380*** 6.380*** 6.380*** 6.301*** 6.301*** 6.301*** 
 (159.98) (98.44) (77.05) (146.10) (88.69) (60.44) 
Observations 39,900 39,900 39,900 38,600 38,600 38,600 
Adjusted R-squared 0.503 0.503 0.503 0.548 0.548 0.548 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank (lending) FE No No No Yes Yes Yes 
State Clustering No No Yes No No Yes 











Table 4: Loan Spread and TREND 
This table presents Log_Spread (labeled as ln_allindrawn here), as a function of long-term climate change trend 
(TREND) and controls. Columns (1), (2), (3) consider mandatory Year fixed effect and Industry (two-digits SIC) fixed 
effect. In column (1) we use robust standard errors, in column (2) we cluster standard errors by firm, in column (3) 
we use two-way clustering of standard errors by firm and state, and in columns (4) to (6) we repeat the models (1) to 
(3) with added Bank (Lending) fixed effects. Values of t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent 
significance at 1% level, 5% level, and 10% level respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES ln_allindrawn ln_allindrawn ln_allindrawn ln_allindrawn ln_allindrawn ln_allindrawn 
TREND 0.306*** 0.306*** 0.306** 0.214*** 0.214** 0.214* 
 (6.72) (2.96) (2.46) (4.58) (2.02) (1.73) 
Log (Asset) -0.183*** -0.183*** -0.183*** -0.174*** -0.174*** -0.174*** 
 (-77.09) (-25.32) (-26.06) (-62.11) (-20.72) (-18.25) 
LEV Ratio 0.503*** 0.503*** 0.503*** 0.465*** 0.465*** 0.465*** 
 (33.34) (17.59) (20.26) (30.64) (16.70) (20.28) 
MTB -0.086*** -0.086*** -0.086*** -0.088*** -0.088*** -0.088*** 
 (-6.56) (-5.44) (-3.05) (-6.55) (-5.67) (-3.26) 
ROA -0.064 -0.064 -0.064 -0.046 -0.046 -0.046 
 (-0.80) (-0.80) (-0.92) (-0.70) (-0.70) (-0.78) 
TERMLOAN -0.041** -0.041* -0.041** -0.039** -0.039* -0.039** 
 (-2.16) (-1.82) (-2.28) (-1.97) (-1.74) (-2.44) 
REVOLVER -0.384*** -0.384*** -0.384*** -0.341*** -0.341*** -0.341*** 
 (-19.45) (-15.96) (-18.16) (-16.69) (-14.27) (-17.28) 
MERGER 0.197*** 0.197*** 0.197*** 0.188*** 0.188*** 0.188*** 
 (14.77) (10.29) (10.14) (14.16) (10.19) (10.37) 
LBO 0.998*** 0.998*** 0.998*** 0.850*** 0.850*** 0.850*** 
 (27.14) (16.64) (20.19) (23.19) (14.71) (16.91) 
CORPPURP 0.073*** 0.073*** 0.073*** 0.088*** 0.088*** 0.088*** 
 (6.19) (4.49) (4.41) (7.54) (5.47) (5.75) 
DEBTPAY 0.206*** 0.206*** 0.206*** 0.198*** 0.198*** 0.198*** 
 (14.96) (11.14) (11.38) (14.45) (10.83) (10.79) 
OTHERTYPE -0.634*** -0.634*** -0.634*** -0.586*** -0.586*** -0.586*** 
 (-27.39) (-21.21) (-19.58) (-24.72) (-19.56) (-19.61) 
WORKCAP 0.134*** 0.134*** 0.134*** 0.141*** 0.141*** 0.141*** 
 (10.45) (7.29) (6.45) (11.20) (7.95) (7.08) 
Constant 6.384*** 6.384*** 6.384*** 6.304*** 6.304*** 6.304*** 
 (160.34) (99.03) (75.45) (146.38) (89.17) (59.74) 
Observations 39,900 39,900 39,900 38,600 38,600 38,600 
Adjusted R-squared 0.503 0.503 0.503 0.548 0.548 0.548 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank (lending) FE No No No Yes Yes Yes 
State Clustering No No Yes No No Yes 











Table 5: Loan Spread and natural hazards intensity  
In this table, as a robustness check of our main results, we present cost of bank loan, Log (Spread), as a function of 
intensity (or damages) due to natural hazards (likely to be influenced by climate change) from SHELDUS database, 
Log (Duration) in Panel A, Property Damage in Panel B, and Crop Damage in Panel C, and controls. Durations are in 
days, Damages (Property or Crop) are in billion dollars and adjusted for 2017.  In column (1) we use robust standard 
errors, in column (2) we cluster standard errors by firm, in column (3) we use two-way clustering of standard errors 
by firm and state, and in columns (4) to (6) we repeat the models (1) to (3) with added Bank (Lending) fixed effects. 
Values of t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent significance at 1% level, 5% level, and 10% level 
respectively. 
Panel A: Spread and Duration (Days)   
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Log (Duration) 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012** 
 (5.99) (3.49) (3.09) (4.82) (2.85) (2.60) 
Constant 6.347*** 6.347*** 6.347*** 6.274*** 6.274*** 6.274*** 
 (158.06) (95.57) (71.98) (144.34) (85.72) (58.43) 
Observations 39,900 39,900 39,900 38,600 38,600 38,600 
Adjusted R-squared 0.503 0.503 0.503 0.548 0.548 0.548 
Panel B: Spread and Property Damage, $B (2017 Adjusted) 
Property_damage 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 (4.90) (3.80) (5.31) (3.85) (3.06) (2.78) 
Constant 6.378*** 6.378*** 6.378*** 6.300*** 6.300*** 6.300*** 
 (159.74) (98.32) (77.74) (145.73) (88.49) (60.48) 
Observations 39,900 39,900 39,900 38,600 38,600 38,600 
Adjusted R-squared 0.503 0.503 0.503 0.548 0.548 0.548 
 
Panel C: Spread and Crop Damage, $B (2017 Adjusted) 
Crop_damage 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 
 (5.56) (3.65) (4.92) (4.98) (3.35) (4.73) 
Constant 6.374*** 6.374*** 6.374*** 6.295*** 6.295*** 6.295*** 
 (159.55) (98.12) (76.57) (145.62) (88.32) (59.94) 
Observations 39,900 39,900 39,900 38,600 38,600 38,600 
Adjusted R-squared 0.503 0.503 0.503 0.549 0.549 0.549 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan T & P FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank (lending) FE No No No Yes Yes Yes 
State Clustering No No Yes No No Yes 











Table 6: Loan Spread and Customer climate risk exposure 
This table presents Log_Spread (labeled as ln_allindrawn), as a function of TREND_CSTMR (TREND at customers’ 
global end) and controls. Columns (1), (2), (3) consider mandatory Year fixed effect and Industry (two-digits SIC) 
fixed effect. In column (1) we use robust standard errors, in column (2) we cluster standard errors by firm, in column 
(3) we use two-way clustering of standard errors by firm and country, and in columns (4) to (6) we repeat the models 
(1) to (3) with added Bank (Lending) fixed effects. Values of t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent 
significance at 1% level, 5% level, and 10% level respectively. Sample period for this analysis is 1986-2014 rather 
than 1986-2017 (as global PDSI data is not available beyond 2014). Number of observations is relatively higher than 
our other similar analyses with NEGPDSI and TREND (as one particular firm can be operated in more than one 
country while in other analyses every firm has obviously one headquarter location only). 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES ln_allindrawn ln_allindrawn ln_allindrawn ln_allindrawn ln_allindrawn ln_allindrawn 
TREND_CSTMR 0.157*** 0.157* 0.157* 0.155*** 0.155** 0.155** 
 (3.15) (1.86) (1.81) (3.26) (2.06) (2.49) 
Log (Asset) -0.195*** -0.195*** -0.195*** -0.186*** -0.186*** -0.186*** 
 (-93.09) (-15.43) (-16.56) (-73.77) (-12.45) (-13.19) 
LEV Ratio 0.555*** 0.555*** 0.555*** 0.511*** 0.511*** 0.511*** 
 (42.92) (11.58) (10.86) (38.82) (10.84) (10.42) 
MTB -0.063*** -0.063*** -0.063*** -0.065*** -0.065*** -0.065*** 
 (-6.04) (-3.38) (-3.98) (-6.28) (-3.69) (-4.28) 
ROA -0.822*** -0.822*** -0.822*** -0.755*** -0.755*** -0.755*** 
 (-11.47) (-6.20) (-6.89) (-10.38) (-5.63) (-6.37) 
TERMLOAN -0.055*** -0.055* -0.055* -0.068*** -0.068** .068** 
 (-3.29) (-1.71) (-1.92) (-3.90) (-2.10) (-2.23) 
REVOLVER -0.442*** -0.442*** -0.442*** -0.417*** -0.417*** -0.417*** 
 (-25.26) (-12.82) (-11.89) (-23.00) (-11.76) (-9.96) 
MERGER 0.181*** 0.181*** 0.181*** 0.183*** 0.183*** 0.183*** 
 (16.79) (5.89) (4.93) (17.05) (6.25) (5.53) 
LBO 1.045*** 1.045*** 1.045*** 0.929*** 0.929*** 0.929*** 
 (29.47) (10.15) (11.51) (26.43) (9.06) (9.09) 
CORPPURP 0.074*** 0.074*** 0.074*** 0.087*** 0.087*** 0.087*** 
 (7.84) (3.03) (3.14) (9.31) (3.58) (3.61) 
DEBTPAY 0.189*** 0.189*** 0.189*** 0.173*** 0.173*** 0.173*** 
 (17.25) (6.72) (6.18) (15.91) (6.19) (4.90) 
OTHERTYPE -0.695*** -0.695*** -0.695*** -0.665*** -0.665*** -0.665*** 
 (-34.94) (-15.67) (-15.32) (-32.43) (-14.38) (-13.15) 
WORKCAP 0.152*** 0.152*** 0.152*** 0.162*** 0.162*** 0.162*** 
 (14.02) (4.94) (5.67) (15.17) (5.24) (5.92) 
Constant 6.408*** 6.408*** 6.408*** 6.346*** 6.346*** 6.346*** 
 (199.39) (63.29) (68.26) (183.86) (55.45) (58.51) 
Observations 58,972 58,972 58,972 57,113 57,113 57,113 
Adjusted R-squared 0.545 0.545 0.545 0.596 0.596 0.596 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank (lending) FE No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Country Clustering No No Yes No No Yes 









Table 7: Double-sorting spread based on maturity and climate change  
In this table we present how spread of bank loan varies with loan maturity (denoted by Ts) and firm’s climate change 
exposure (denoted by Qs). Since firms can be susceptible to a long-term business risk if climate change exposure is 
higher, lenders (banks) also should penalize them for the loans with longer maturities. Here we report results from 
independently sorting of loan spreads based on maturity and TREND. ***, **, and * represent significance at 1% 
level, 5% level, and 10% level respectively. 
Double Sorting Spread by Maturity (T) and Trend (Q)  
Q1 
(Low climate exposure) 
Q2 Q3 
Q4  
(High climate exposure) 
T1 (Low Maturity) 139.416 147.244 156.702 156.961 
T2 187.017 194.227 189.222 200.400 
T3 158.736 142.024 165.811 175.133 
T4 (High Maturity) 220.790 205.240 226.708 231.927 
 Difference t-statistics 
T4, Q4 – T1, Q1 92.511*** 22.360 
T4, Q4 – T4, Q1 11.137** 2.346 
T4, Q4 - T1, Q4 74.966*** 18.001 
T4, Q1 - T1, Q1 81.374*** 19.738 




















Table 8: Loan Subsamples 
In this table we present a series of subsample analyses based on our original analysis of log (spread) as a function of 
TREND and controls (Table 4). Panel A1 and A2 present Investment Grade vs. Noninvestment Grade, Panel B1 and 
B2 present Long Maturity (T3 and T4) vs. Short Maturity (T1 and T2), and Panel C1 and C2 present Higher Exposure 
(Q3 and Q4) vs. Lower Exposure (Q1 and Q2) subsamples. In column (1) we use robust standard errors, in column 
(2) we cluster standard errors by firm, in column (3) we use two-way clustering of standard errors by firm and state, 
and in columns (4) to (6) we repeat the models (1) to (3) with added Bank (Lending) fixed effects. Values of t-statistics 
are in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent significance at 1% level, 5% level, and 10% level respectively.  
Panel A1: Investment Grade 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
TREND 0.140 0.140 0.140 0.159 0.159 0.159 
 (1.23) (0.58) (0.59) (1.35) (0.64) (0.64) 
CONSTANT 6.126*** 6.126*** 6.126*** 6.022*** 6.022*** 6.022*** 
 (76.49) (47.67) (54.53) (71.49) (45.92) (49.16) 
N 7,578 7,578 7,578 7,326 7,326 7,326 
ADJ.  R2 0.564 0.564 0.564 0.598 0.598 0.598 
Panel A2: Noninvestment Grade 
       
TREND 0.370*** 0.370*** 0.370*** 0.273*** 0.273*** 0.273*** 
 (7.99) (4.08) (3.56) (5.80) (2.99) (3.63) 
CONSTANT 6.150*** 6.150*** 6.150*** 6.117*** 6.117*** 6.117*** 
 (154.19) (101.83) (83.81) (141.97) (93.08) (68.57) 
N 31,071 31,071 31,071 30,040 30,040 30,040 
ADJ.  R2 0.380 0.380 0.380 0.444 0.444 0.444 
Firm control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan T&P FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank (lending) FE No No No Yes Yes Yes 
State Clustering No No Yes No No Yes 

















Panel B1: Long Maturity (T3 and T4) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
TREND 0.296*** 0.296** 0.296** 0.177*** 0.177 0.177 
 (4.84) (2.44) (2.57) (2.88) (1.45) (1.44) 
CONSTANT 6.287*** 6.287*** 6.287*** 6.245*** 6.245*** 6.245*** 
 (133.42) (67.20) (53.51) (127.56) (59.18) (43.67) 
N 19,326 19,326 19,326 18,737 18,737 18,737 
ADJ.  R2 0.522 0.522 0.522 0.576 0.576 0.576 
Panel B2: Short Maturity (T1 and T2) 
       
TREND 0.228*** 0.228** 0.228* 0.169** 0.169 0.169 
 (3.45) (1.99) (1.65) (2.40) (1.39) (1.18) 
CONSTANT 6.226*** 6.226*** 6.226*** 6.178*** 6.178*** 6.178*** 
 (84.24) (73.51) (75.50) (80.37) (71.94) (58.89) 
N 19,323 19,323 19,323 18,541 18,541 18,541 
ADJ.  R2 0.534 0.534 0.534 0.569 0.569 0.569 
Firm control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan T&P FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank (lending) FE No No No Yes Yes Yes 
State Clustering No No Yes No No Yes 
Firm Clustering No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
 
Panel C1: Higher Exposure (Q3 and Q4) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
TREND 0.369*** 0.369* 0.369 0.286** 0.286 0.286 
 (3.42) (1.72) (1.39) (2.55) (1.28) (1.28) 
CONSTANT 6.346*** 6.346*** 6.346*** 6.248*** 6.248*** 6.248*** 
 (120.77) (67.65) (58.28) (105.92) (57.77) (48.52) 
N 19,314 19,314 19,314 18,654 18,654 18,654 
ADJ.  R2 0.493 0.493 0.493 0.541 0.541 0.541 
Panel C2: Lower Exposure (Q1 and Q2) 
       
TREND -0.360*** -0.360 -0.360 -0.289** -0.289 -0.289 
 (-2.91) (-1.50) (-1.02) (-2.28) (-1.21) (-0.86) 
CONSTANT 6.428*** 6.428*** 6.428*** 6.411*** 6.411*** 6.411*** 
 (149.74) (94.57) (89.17) (144.41) (92.17) (101.41) 
N 19,337 19,337 19,337 18,651 18,651 18,651 
ADJ.  R2 0.535 0.535 0.535 0.583 0.583 0.583 
Firm control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan T&P FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank (lending) FE No No No Yes Yes Yes 
State Clustering No No Yes No No Yes 








Table 9: Loan Subsample Driving the effect 
In this table, we present a series of subsample analyses. Panel A presents High Exposure (Q3 and Q4), Long Maturity 
(T3 and T4) and Noninvestment subsample. Panel B presents High Exposure (Q3 and Q4), Short Maturity (T1 and 
T2) and Noninvestment subsample. Panel C presents Low Exposure (Q1 and Q2), Long Maturity (T3 and T4) and 
Noninvestment subsample. Panel D presents High Exposure (Q3 and Q4), Long Maturity (T3 and T4) and Investment 
subsample. Panel E presents Low Exposure (Q1 and Q2), Short Maturity (T1 and T2) and Investment subsample. In 
column (1) we use robust standard errors, in column (2) we cluster standard errors by firm, in column (3) we use two-
way clustering of standard errors by firm and state, and in columns (4) to (6) we repeat the models (1) to (3) with 
added Bank (Lending) fixed effects. Values of t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent significance at 
1% level, 5% level, and 10% level respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: High Exposure (Q3 and Q4), Long Maturity (T3 and T4), Noninvestment 
TREND 0.406*** 0.406* 0.406 0.366** 0.366* 0.366* 
 (2.87) (1.81) (1.51) (2.57) (1.64) (1.87) 
CONSTANT 6.027*** 6.027*** 6.027*** 5.976*** 5.976*** 5.976*** 
 (100.92) (51.28) (44.03) (91.16) (42.44) (38.45) 
N 8,327 8,327 8,327 8,017 8,017 8,017 
ADJ.  R2 0.411 0.411 0.411 0.484 0.484 0.484 
Panel B: High Exposure (Q3 and Q4), Short Maturity (T1 and T2), Noninvestment 
TREND 0.370** 0.370 0.370 0.184 0.184 0.184 
 (2.27) (1.54) (1.14) (1.04) (0.72) (0.63) 
CONSTANT 5.897*** 5.897*** 5.897*** 5.841*** 5.841*** 5.841*** 
 (61.53) (55.74) (57.34) (55.84) (52.00) (41.00) 
N 7,473 7,473 7,473 7,080 7,080 7,080 
ADJ.  R2 0.400 0.400 0.400 0.454 0.454 0.454 
Panel C: Low Exposure (Q1 and Q2), Long Maturity (T3 and T4), Noninvestment 
TREND -0.347** -0.347 -0.347 -0.262 -0.262 -0.262 
 (-2.17) (-1.42) (-1.13) (-1.61) (-1.07) (-0.95) 
CONSTANT 6.078*** 6.078*** 6.078*** 6.104*** 6.104*** 6.104*** 
 (102.26) (76.45) (81.27) (95.07) (74.91) (86.32) 
N 7,917 7,917 7,917 7,608 7,608 7,608 
ADJ.  R2 0.457 0.457 0.457 0.524 0.524 0.524 
Panel D: High Exposure (Q3 and Q4), Long Maturity (T3 and T4), Investment 
TREND 0.402 0.402 0.402 0.123 0.123 0.123 
 (0.92) (0.63) (0.85) (0.26) (0.18) (0.23) 
CONSTANT 6.237*** 6.237*** 6.237*** 6.084*** 6.084*** 6.084*** 
 (35.67) (26.93) (27.40) (30.36) (25.09) (21.28) 
N 1,428 1,428 1,428 1,350 1,350 1,350 
ADJ.  R2 0.623 0.623 0.623 0.654 0.654 0.654 
Panel E: Low Exposure (Q1 and Q2), Short Maturity (T1 and T2), Investment 
TREND -0.289 -0.289 -0.289 -0.248 -0.248 -0.248 
 (-0.68) (-0.44) (-0.34) (-0.54) (-0.34) (-0.28) 
CONSTANT 6.015*** 6.015*** 6.015*** 6.106*** 6.106*** 6.106*** 
 (37.13) (28.53) (38.00) (34.78) (26.57) (32.14) 
N 2,415 2,415 2,415 2,304 2,304 2,304 
ADJ.  R2 0.597 0.597 0.597 0.626 0.626 0.626 
Firm control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan T&P FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank (lending) FE No No No Yes Yes Yes 
State Clustering No No Yes No No Yes 
Firm Clustering No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 




Table 10: Difference-in-Difference 
This table presents Difference-in-Difference (DiD) results of log (spread) around Stern Review (2006) for our entire 
sample (takes TREND interacted with Stern dummy as key independent variable), and Noninvestment and Investment 
subsamples (takes High Exposure, Long Maturity and Stern dummies interacted together as key independent variable). 
A 10-year window uses sample period 2002-2011 and a 5-year window uses sample period 2004-2008. Values of t-
statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent significance at 1% level, 5% level, and 10% level respectively. 
 Entire Sample  Non-Investment  Investment 
 10 years 5 years  10 years 5 years  10 years 5 years 
TREND * Stern -0.219 -0.011       
 (-0.89) (-0.05)       
T34 *Q34*Stern    0.067* 0.103  -0.033 0.074 
    (1.79) (1.49)  (-0.58) (0.80) 
T34*Stern    -0.008 0.036  0.033 -0.070 
    (-0.26) (0.68)  (0.64) (-1.37) 
Q34*Stern    -0.042 -0.086*  -0.105** -0.181** 
    (-1.16) (-1.74)  (-2.40) (-2.06) 
T34*Q34    -0.012 -0.032  -0.025 -0.084 
    (-0.47) (-0.99)  (-0.52) (-1.21) 
Q34    0.038 0.068***  0.091* 0.117* 
    (1.66) (2.94)  (2.00) (1.69) 
T34    -0.127*** -0.149***  -0.109*** -0.065 
    (-5.82) (-5.07)  (-2.81) (-1.38) 
CONSTANT 6.305*** 6.404***  6.007*** 6.055***  6.123*** 5.988*** 
 (45.50) (32.86)  (49.32) (38.48)  (32.89) (25.73) 
N 14,229 7,625  10,662 5,715  3,535 1,888 
ADJ.  R2 0.588 0.574  0.457 0.438  0.664 0.525 
Firm control Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Loan control Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Loan T&P FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Bank (lending) FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
State Clustering Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 














Table 11: Other contractual features of loans (entire sample) 
This table presents different contractual features of a loan as a function of long-term climate change trend (TREND) 
and controls. Panels A to Panel F present results for Deal Amount, Maturity, Number of Lenders in Loan Syndicate, 
Upfront Fee, Total Covenants, and Secured Loans as dependent variables, respectively. In Panel A to Panel D 
dependent variables are log-transformed.  Columns (1), (2), (3) include mandatory Year fixed effect and Industry 
(two-digits SIC) fixed effect. In column (1) we use robust standard errors, in column (2) we cluster standard errors by 
firm, in column (3) we use two-way clustering of standard errors by firm and state, and in columns (4) to (6) we repeat 
the models (1) to (3) with added Bank (Lending) fixed effects. Values of t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
represent significance at 1% level, 5% level, and 10% level respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: Deal Amount 
TREND -0.326*** -0.326* -0.326 -0.265*** -0.265 -0.265 
 (-4.41) (-1.94) (-1.05) (-3.53) (-1.63) (-0.92) 
N 39,900 39,900 39,900 38,600 38,600 38,600 
ADJ.  R2 0.683 0.683 0.683 0.710 0.710 0.710 
Panel B: Maturity 
TREND -0.071* -0.071 -0.071 -0.068 -0.068 -0.068 
 (-1.72) (-1.18) (-0.76) (-1.63) (-1.14) (-1.18) 
N 38,651 38,651 38,651 37,457 37,457 37,457 
ADJ.  R2 0.466 0.466 0.466 0.497 0.497 0.497 
Panel C: Number of Lenders in the Loan Syndicate 
TREND -0.449*** -0.449*** -0.449 -0.353*** -0.353*** -0.353 
 (-6.52) (-3.31) (-1.28) (-5.04) (-2.75) (-1.17) 
N 39,879 39,879 39,879 38,600 38,600 38,600 
ADJ.  R2 0.367 0.367 0.367 0.423 0.423 0.423 
Panel D: Upfront Fee 
TREND 0.783*** 0.783*** 0.783*** 0.511*** 0.511** 0.511** 
 (4.47) (3.50) (3.47) (2.68) (2.09) (2.59) 
N 7,462 7,462 7,462 6,964 6,964 6,964 
ADJ.  R2 0.252 0.252 0.252 0.325 0.325 0.325 
Panel E: Total Covenants 
TREND 0.484** 0.484 0.484 0.563** 0.563 0.563 
 (1.97) (1.07) (1.12) (2.18) (1.23) (1.42) 
N 39,900 39,900 39,900 38,600 38,600 38,600 
ADJ.  R2 0.288 0.288 0.288 0.343 0.343 0.343 
Panel F: Secured Loan 
TREND 0.140*** 0.140 0.140 0.099** 0.099 0.099 
 (3.50) (1.62) (1.34) (2.33) (1.09) (0.91) 
N 26,623 26,623 26,623 25,770 25,770 25,770 
ADJ.  R2 0.285 0.285 0.285 0.323 0.323 0.323 
Firm control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan T&P FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank (lending) FE No No No Yes Yes Yes 
State Clustering No No Yes No No Yes 
Firm Clustering No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 





Table 12: Other contractual features of loans for subsample 
This table presents the results of studying different contractual features of loans as a function of long-term climate 
change trend (TREND) for a subsample of long-term loans, issued to poorly rated firms with high exposure to climate 
risk. Panel A to Panel F present results for Deal Amount, Maturity, Number of Lenders in Loan Syndicate, Upfront 
Fee, Total Covenants, and Secured Loans as dependent variables, respectively. In Panel A to Panel D dependent 
variables are log-transformed.  Columns (1), (2), (3) use mandatory Year fixed effect and Industry (two-digits SIC) 
fixed effect. In column (1) we use robust standard errors, in column (2) we cluster standard errors by firm, in column 
(3) we use two-way clustering of standard errors by firm and state, and in columns (4) to (6) we repeat the models (1) 
to (3) with added Bank (Lending) fixed effects. Values of t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent 
significance at 1% level, 5% level, and 10% level respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: Deal Amount 
TREND -1.684*** -1.684*** -1.684*** -1.416*** -1.416*** -1.416*** 
 (-6.96) (-3.91) (-4.44) (-5.78) (-3.37) (-3.77) 
N 8,327 8,327 8,327 8,017 8,017 8,017 
ADJ.  R2 0.663 0.663 0.663 0.700 0.700 0.700 
Panel B: Maturity 
TREND 0.010 0.010 0.010 -0.016 -0.016 -0.016 
 (0.26) (0.20) (0.21) (-0.42) (-0.34) (-0.41) 
N 8,327 8,327 8,327 8,017 8,017 8,017 
ADJ.  R2 0.271 0.271 0.271 0.333 0.333 0.333 
Panel C: Number of Lenders in the Loan Syndicate 
TREND -1.642*** -1.642*** -1.642*** -1.335*** -1.335*** -1.335*** 
 (-6.96) (-4.38) (-3.78) (-5.62) (-3.76) (-3.47) 
N 8,320 8,320 8,320 8,017 8,017 8,017 
ADJ.  R2 0.314 0.314 0.314 0.395 0.395 0.395 
Panel D: Upfront Fee 
TREND 0.307 0.307 0.307 -0.895 -0.895 -0.895 
 (0.48) (0.41) (0.41) (-1.27) (-1.12) (-1.35) 
N 1,629 1,629 1,629 1,485 1,485 1,485 
ADJ.  R2 0.242 0.242 0.242 0.335 0.335 0.335 
Panel E: Total Covenants 
TREND 2.428** 2.428 2.428 2.342** 2.342 2.342* 
 (2.45) (1.46) (1.66) (2.27) (1.42) (1.77) 
N 8,327 8,327 8,327 8,017 8,017 8,017 
ADJ.  R2 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.374 0.374 0.374 
Panel F: Secured Loan 
TREND 0.460*** 0.460** 0.460** 0.487*** 0.487** 0.487** 
 (3.40) (2.02) (2.54) (3.38) (2.02) (2.64) 
N 6,313 6,313 6,313 6,075 6,075 6,075 
ADJ.  R2 0.235 0.235 0.235 0.281 0.281 0.281 
Firm control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan T&P FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank (lending) FE No No No Yes Yes Yes 
State Clustering No No Yes No No Yes 
Firm Clustering No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
 





Figure 1: Historical trends of drought (CA vs. VT) 
This figure compares the evolution of the long-term climate change trends of the U.S. state with the highest drought 
exposure, California (CA), and the state with the lowest drought exposure, Vermont (VT). Every point is determined 
from an AR(1) model: 𝑷𝑫𝑺𝑰𝒔,𝒕 = 𝒂 + 𝒃 ∗ 𝑻𝒊𝒎𝒆𝒔 + 𝒄 ∗ 𝑷𝑫𝑺𝑰𝒔,𝒕 𝟏 + 𝜺𝒔,𝒕 using monthly frequency state-level 
historical PDSI data extending back to 1895.The higher value of “Time beta” indicates the higher exposure to climate 





















































Figure 2: Movements in SPREAD following the Stern Review (2006)  
 
This figure presents the difference in the loan spread following the Stern Review (2006). The group-1 (solid line) 
takes the value of 1 if the observation belongs to the subsample of long-term loans of poorly rated firms with high 
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Table A.1: Variable Definitions  
Variable Definition Source 
NEGPDSI Negative Palmer Drought Severity Index 
(PDSI);  
NOAA's National Climatic Data Center (NCDC); 
www.ncdc.noaa.gov/temp-and-precip/drought/historical-
palmers 
TREND Negative time trend coefficient (times 1,000) of 
an AR1 model extends back to 1895 for each 
state at each point of sample period using 
monthly frequency data; 
 




TREND_CSTMR TREND determined from firms’ customer 
segmentation locations (countries)  
 
Log (Duration) The observed number of days of climate change 
related natural hazards (aggregated to state 
level); log-transformed 
SHELDUS (Arizona State University); 
https://cemhs.asu.edu/sheldus  
Log (Spread) The interest amount paid by borrowers annually 
over LIBOR in basis points; log-transformed 




Total Deal Amount; log-transformed LPC DealScan; 
   
Log (Lenders) Number of Lenders in loan syndication; log-
transformed 
LPC DealScan;    
Log (Maturity) Maturity of loan in months; log-transformed LPC DealScan;    
Total Covenants Total number of Financial and General 
Covenants in loan contracts 
LPC DealScan;    
Log (Upfront 
Fee) 
Upfront fee paid by borrowers for loans; log-
transformed 
LPC DealScan;  
   
Secured Loan Dummy (=1, if the loan is secured, =0 if the 
loan is not secured) 
LPC DealScan 
Log (Asset) Total Asset; log-transformed COMPUSTAT;    
LEV Ratio Total debt over Asset COMPUSTAT;    
MTB Market to Book value COMPUSTAT;    
ROA Return on Assets COMPUSTAT;   
TERMLOAN Loan type dummy  LPC DealScan 
REVOLVER Loan type dummy LPC DealScan 
OTHERTYPE Loan type dummy LPC DealScan 
CORPPURP Loan purpose dummy LPC DealScan 
WORKCAP Loan purpose dummy LPC DealScan 
DEBTPAY Loan purpose dummy LPC DealScan 
LBO Loan purpose dummy LPC DealScan 
MERGER Loan purpose dummy LPC DealScan 
Stern Dummy (=1, if year is later than 2006, = 0 otherwise) 
T34 Dummy (=1, if loan maturity is above 50% of the sample, =0 otherwise) 
T12 Dummy (=1, if loan maturity is below 50% of the sample, =0 otherwise) 
Q34 Dummy (=1, if climate exposure is above 50% of the sample, =0 otherwise) 
Q12 Dummy (=1, if climate exposure is below 50% of the sample, =0 otherwise) 
Investment Dummy (=1, if S&P credit rating is BBB- or above, =0 otherwise) 
Noninvestment Dummy (=1, if S&P credit rating is below BBB-, =0 otherwise) 
 
  




Table A.2: AR(1) model summary 
This table presents the summary of our AR(1) model: 𝑷𝑫𝑺𝑰𝒔,𝒕 = 𝒂 + 𝒃 ∗ 𝑻𝒊𝒎𝒆𝒔 + 𝒄 ∗ 𝑷𝑫𝑺𝑰𝒔,𝒕 𝟏 + 𝜺𝒔,𝒕 . We use 
monthly state-level PDSI data extends back to 1895 to produce time-beta (indication of long-term climate change 
trend) for each state and later we convert them to yearly data for our main analyses. Here we report the values based 
on the beginning year of our sample period (1986). The states appear in the upper part of the list (marked with higher 
ranks) are having relatively higher long-term climate change exposure according to our model and vice-versa.  
RANK STATE Constant β TIME β Adj. R2 
1 CALIFORNIA 0.041890077 0.071093 0.800210357 
2 FLORIDA 0.045965944 0.06378 0.793352842 
3 NEW JERSEY 0.038899709 0.061901 0.732830107 
4 MONTANA 0.063882873 0.05957 0.869851112 
5 CONNECTICUT 0.02851636 0.0447 0.692309678 
6 DELAWARE 0.007264971 0.041048 0.754312635 
7 WYOMING 0.042410329 0.038327 0.904199481 
8 UTAH 0.037156258 0.035555 0.879621983 
9 ARIZONA 0.022116868 0.033218 0.873995245 
10 COLORADO 0.040159263 0.03206 0.888762891 
11 NEVADA 0.0095003 0.027769 0.867517412 
12 NORTH DAKOTA 0.049814399 0.024894 0.8726753 
13 NEW MEXICO 0.025073208 0.023278 0.889391482 
14 NORTH CAROLINA 0.007864357 0.023144 0.744701147 
15 NEBRASKA 0.032512792 0.013787 0.909736157 
16 SOUTH DAKOTA 0.040772591 0.011922 0.914582431 
17 MARYLAND -0.020236939 0.00563 0.743164063 
18 OREGON -0.000947462 0.0018 0.795211136 
19 RHODE ISLAND 0.001213861 0.00103 0.669015706 
20 IDAHO -0.004400438 -0.00789 0.869222641 
21 VIRGINIA -0.020099884 -0.01236 0.743118882 
22 WEST VIRGINIA -0.003793512 -0.016 0.779188097 
23 MISSOURI 0.002399281 -0.01621 0.844884872 
24 WASHINGTON -0.022082401 -0.01668 0.797766984 
25 SOUTH CAROLINA -0.014855197 -0.01732 0.773072362 
26 KANSAS -0.003233251 -0.02272 0.887353003 
27 OHIO -0.009510639 -0.0279 0.813233554 
28 PENNSYLVANIA -0.025702134 -0.02959 0.752878904 
29 GEORGIA -0.028575726 -0.03008 0.784427762 
30 MINNESOTA -0.007247688 -0.03554 0.884492934 
31 TEXAS -0.031455591 -0.03705 0.881343246 
32 WISCONSIN -0.011648318 -0.04347 0.828523934 
33 IOWA -0.024731619 -0.05686 0.869151175 
34 ARKANSAS -0.049752492 -0.05908 0.790185213 
35 ILLINOIS -0.037395038 -0.06353 0.831258595 
36 OKLAHOMA -0.037345178 -0.06379 0.847272396 
37 MASSACHUSETTS -0.074712187 -0.079 0.685233355 
38 MAINE -0.076741062 -0.08127 0.717884302 
39 INDIANA -0.054220159 -0.08855 0.805407763 
40 KENTUCKY -0.074222535 -0.0952 0.808203995 
41 NEW YORK -0.073170573 -0.09745 0.726056457 
42 LOUISIANA -0.089919895 -0.09897 0.764423132 
43 MICHIGAN -0.071322151 -0.10245 0.793337345 
44 TENNESSEE -0.081521258 -0.11306 0.780188978 
45 MISSISSIPPI -0.100566685 -0.12039 0.790456951 
46 ALABAMA -0.104531199 -0.12211 0.754764497 
47 NEW HAMPSHIRE -0.144874349 -0.14848 0.683225691 
48 VERMONT -0.197533309 -0.22725 0.723297715 
 




Table A.3: Pairwise Correlation between SHELDUS measures and other measure 
In this table, we present pairwise correlations between different measures of climate risk. 
Panel D: Pairwise Correlation 
Variables NEGPDSI TREND Log (Duration) Property_damage Crop_damage 
NEGPDSI 1.000     
TREND 0.344*** 1.000    
Log (Duration) -0.059*** 0.067*** 1.000   
Property_damage 0.007 0.095*** 0.080*** 1.000  





























Figure A.1: Historical drought trends for different states 
This figure presents the evolution of long-term climate change trends of different U.S. main-land-states over the years. 
Numerical numbers 1 to 48 correspond the 48 U.S. main-land states in an alphabetical order. Every point is determined 
from an AR(1) model: 𝑷𝑫𝑺𝑰𝒔,𝒕 = 𝒂 + 𝒃 ∗ 𝑻𝒊𝒎𝒆𝒔 + 𝒄 ∗ 𝑷𝑫𝑺𝑰𝒔,𝒕 𝟏 + 𝜺𝒔,𝒕 using monthly frequency state-level 
historical PDSI data extending back to 1895.The upward (downward) trends indicates the higher (lower) exposure to 
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